

Message Text

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ACTION IO-11

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 EUR-12 EA-07 ISO-00 ACDA-05 CIAE-00

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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5466

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

USLO PEKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USUN 0218

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, KS, KN

SUBJECT: 30TH UNGA - KOREA

REF: USUN 6073

1. SUMMARY: THE 30TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S (UNGA) CONSIDERATION OF THE KOREAN ITEM, EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF INSURING THAT OUR RESPECT FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S (ROK) SOVEREIGNTY CONTINUES CRYSTAL CLEAR. THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION'S TRANSPARENT DOWNGRADING OF ROK SOVEREIGNTY AND NORTH KOREAN INTRANSIGENCE TO EFFORTS AT COMPROMISE WERE POINTS IN OUR FAVOR. FURTHERMORE, OUR REPORTS ON STEPS TO RESTRICT USE OF THE UN FLAG IN SOUTH KOREA AS WELL AS ON UN COMMAND (UNC) COMPOSITION AND ACTIVITY WERE VALUABLE IN REMOVING THEMES FOR HOSTILE THRUSTS IN DEBATE. WITH A VIEW TO LIMITING POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER
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CONFRONTATIONAL DEBATE AT THE UN ON KOREA, WE SHOULD CONTINUE

TO EMPHASIZE OUR READINESS FOR DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION WITH THE OTHER SAID. FURTHERMORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING ABLE TO REPORT TO THE UN RELATIVELY SOON THAT THE UNC'S COMPETENCE AND THE UNITS IT COMPREHENDS RELATE ONLY TO MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT STRIKES US AS WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION. THIS COULD PAVE THE WAY FOR EVENTUAL REMOVAL OF THE UNC AS A CONTENTIOUS UN ISSUE. IN PLENARY VOTING, ALTHOUGH THE NONALIGNED GAVE THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION 40 OF ITS 53 "YES" VOTES, THERE REMAINED 37 NONALIGNED VOTES IN THE "NO", ABSTAIN, AND ABSENT COLUMNS. ON OUR RESOLUTION, WHICH ALSO PASSED, THE NONALIGNED GAVE US 13 OF OUR 59 "YES" VOTES. ADDITIONALLY, THERE WERE TWENTY-FOUR ABSTENTIONS AND THREE ABSENCES AMONG THE NONALIGNED, A TOTAL TOGETHER WITH THE 13 "YES" VOTES SURPASSING THE 37 NONALIGNED "NO" VOTES ON OUR RESOLUTION. END SUMMARY.

2. THE RESOLUTIONS: ON NOVEMBER 18, 1975, THE UNGA PLENARY ADOPTED TWO RESOLUTIONS ON KOREA. THE FIRST, COSPONSORED BY THE U.S. AND 27 OTHERS, PASSED 59 (US)-51-29. THE SECOND, COSPONSORED BY THE USSR, CHINA, AND 41 OTHERS (COMMUNIST AND NONALIGNED) PASSED 54-43 (US)-42. OUR RESOLUTION OFFERED TO TERMINATE THE UNC PROVIDED ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS TO MAINTAIN THE ARMISTICE WERE ESTABLISHED. IT CALLED FOR DISCUSSIONS AMONG ALL PARTIES CONCERNED (INCLUDING SOUTH KOREA) REGARDING ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS TO MAINTAIN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THE COMMUNIST-SPONSORED RESOLUTION CALLED FOR TERMINATION OF THE UNC AND WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS STATIONED IN SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE FLAG OF THE UNITED NATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, IT CALLED ON "THE REAL PARTIES TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT" TO REPLACE THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WITH A PEACE AGREEMENT. DURING THE COMMITTEE ONE DEBATE, NORTH KOREA'S VICE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS MOK FLATLY REJECTED SOUTH KOREAN PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE TALKS CALLED FOR BY THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION. MOK ALSO STRESSED THAT DISSOLUTION OF THE UNC AND WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS FROM SOUTH KOREA "MUST NOT BE SEPARATED". THUS THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION SOUGHT TO LIMIT PEACE TALKS TO THE U.S. AND NORTH KOREA WHILE EXCLUDING THE ROK. ADDITIONALLY, THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION FLOUTED ROK SOVEREIGNTY FURTHER BY CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS IN SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE US-ROK MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY. CONFIDENTIAL

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COMMENTING ON THIS IN PLENARY NOVEMBER 18, AMBASSADOR BENNETT STRESSED: "ARE WE TO ASSUME THAT THOSE WHO SUPPORT RESOLUTION B IN THE COMMITTEE REPORT SUBSCRIBE TO A DOCTRINE OF LIMITED SOVERIGNTY FOR THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA? THIS DOCTRINE IS, I BELIEVE, NOT UNFAMILIAR TO A NUMBER OF MEMBER STATES WHO COSPONSORED RESOLUTION B.

3. ATTEMPTS AT COMPROMISE: AFTER ADOPTION OF THE TWO

RESOLUTIONS BY COMMITTEE ONE ON OCTOBER 29, A GROUP (ENTITLED "THE GROUP OF 13") INCLUDING SWEDEN, AUSTRIA, THE ASEANS, DENMARK, NORWAY, FIJI, PAPUA-NEW GUINEA, TUNISIA AND NEPAL TRIED TO PROMOTE A COMPROMISE RESOLUTION. WHILE OUR SIDE MAINTAINED A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ANY GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO BRING THE TWO SIDES TOGETHER, THE NORTH KOREANS MET THIS INITIATIVE WITH TOTAL INTRANSIGENCE.

4. SUPPORT FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION:

(A) ON JUNE 27, 1975, OUR RESOLUTION WAS SUBMITTED TO THE UN SECRETARIAT ALONG WITH REQUEST FOR INCLUSION OF AN ITEM IN THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF THE 30TH UNGA. THE U.S., U.K., CANADA, JAPAN, THE NETHERLANDS AND COSTA RICA WERE INITIAL COSPONSORS. NEW ZEALAND'S INSTRUCTIONS TO COSPONSOR WERE DELAYED SLIGHTLY, BUT SHE JOINED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY IN COSPONSORSHIP. WHEN OUR AMENDED RESOLUTION WAS VOTED ON IN COMMITTEE ONE IN OCTOBER 29 IT HAD THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS: BARBADOS, BELGIUM, BOLIVIA, CAR, COLOMBIA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, FRANCE, GABON, THE GAMBIA, FRG, GRENADA, GUATEMALA, HAITI, HONDURAS, IRELAND, ITALY, LIBERIA, LUXEMBOURG, NICARAGUA, PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY. A NUMBER OF THESE HAD JOINED FRANCE IN COSPONSORING SOME HELPFUL AMENDMENTS AND BECAME COSPONSORS OF THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE WHEN THE AMENDMENTS WERE INCORPORATED.

(B) ALTHOUGH OUR 1974 RESOLUTION ON KOREA SUCCEEDED IN PLENARY 6, (US)-43-3), THERE WERE THOSE WHO PREDICTED HARD GOING FOR OUR 1975 RESOLUTION. DURING AUGUST JAPAN'S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, SAITO SAID SO PUBLICLY IN A PRESS INTERVIEW IN JAPAN. THEY COULD POINT TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVERS IN CAMBODIA AND LAGOS, THE ADMISSION OF LEFT-LEANING UN MEMBERS SUCH AS MOZAMBIQUE, CAPE VERDE, AND

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SAO-TOME AND PRINCIPE, ALLEGEDLY ADVERSE REACTION TO OUR VETOES OF VIETNAM MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS AND THE NON-ALIGNED'S ADMISSION OF NORTH KOREA AND EXCLUSION OF SOUTH KOREA AT LIMA.

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ACTION IO-11

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

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V(C) INDEED DANGER MANIFESTED ITSELF SHARPLY WHEN THE UNGA'S GENERAL COMMITTEE MET ON SEPTEMBER 17 TO CONSIDER THE AGENDA FOR THE 30TH UNGA. THIS TWENTY-FIVE MEMBER COMMITTEE, HEADED BY THE UNGA PRESIDENT (WHO TRADITIONALLY DOES NOT VOTE), VOTED ONLY 9 (US)-8-7 TO INSCRIBE OUR ITEM ON KOREA. HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE SUPPORT OF PERU, WHICH IN AUGUST HAD HOSTED THE NONALIGNED MINISTERIAL PLENARY, AND SIERRA LEONE, WHICH WAS INITIALLY A COSPONSOR OF THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION, OUR ITEM WOULD NOT HAVE MADE THE AGENDA. IN ADDITION TO THE U.S., PERU AND SIERRA LEONE, OTHERS TO SUPPORT INSCRIPTION OF OUR ITEM WERE BARBADOS, FRANCE, HONDURAS, NORWAY, SWEDEN, AND U.K. A COMMUNIST BLOC INCLUDING BULGARIA, CHINA, CUBA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, MONGOLIA, AND MOZAMBIQUE (A "MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT" TO THE GENERAL COMMITTEE BY THE ARFICAN REGIONAL GROUP SINCE MOZAMBIQUE ONLY ON SEPTEMBER 16 BECAME A UN MEMBER) PLUS SENEGAL DEFIED THE TRADITION OF LIBERAL INSCRIPTION OF UNGA AGENDA ITEM BY VOTING AGAINST INSCRIPTION OF OUR ITEM.
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BAHRAIN, BANGLADESH, KENYA, LEBANON, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, TUNISIA, AND ZAIRE ABSTAINED.

(D) AGAIN IN COMMITTEE ONE, SENEGAL FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN AN EFFORT TO DENY OUR RESOLUTION THE VOTING PRIORITY

IT PROPERLY ENJOYED. HOWEVER, DUE IN CONSIDERABLE PART TO THE TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION OF AMBASSADOR BAROODY OF SAUDO ARABIA, THIS ATTEMPT PETERED OUT.

(E) IN 1974, THE MARGIN OF SUCCESS FOR OUR RESOLUTION WAS 19 IN COMMITTEE ONE AND 18 IN PLENARY: COMMITTEE ONE 61 (US)-42-32; PLENARY 61 (US)-43-31. IN 1975, OUR RESOLUTION'S MARGIN WAS EIGHT BOTH IN COMMITTEE ONE AND PLENARY: COMMITTEE ONE 59 (US) - 51-29; PLENARY 59 (US) - 51-29. IN COMMITTEE ONE, WE LOST SIX 1974 VOTES IN FAVOR: CHAD, EDUADOR, CAMBODIA, PANAMA, QATAR, AND TUNISIA. WE GAINED FOUR VOTES IN FAVOR: INDONESIA, MALAWI, THE MALDIVES, AND SINGAPORE. THE HOSTILE SIDE GAINED TEN VOTES AGAINST OUR RESOLUTION FORM: CAMBODIA, CAPE VERDE, ETHIOPIA, GHANA, GUYANA, LAOS, MOZAMBIQUE, NIGERIA, SAO, TOME AND PRINCIPE, AND CAMEROON. THE HOSTILE SIDE LOST ONE VOTE AGAINST OUR RESOLUTION: UGANDA.

(F) IN THE PLENARY VOTE, THERE WERE SEVERAL CHANGES FROM COMMITTEE ONE POSITIONS: ECUADOR SWITCHED FROM ABSTENTION TO A VOTE IN FAVOR OF OUR RESOLUTION; UPPER VOLTA WAS ABSENT RATHER THAN VOTING AGAINST US; THE GAMIBA WAS ABSENT RATHER THAN VOTING FOR US; AND PANAMA VOTED AGAINST US RATHER THAN BEING ABSENT. ADDITIONALLY, THE COMOROS, ADMITTED TO THE UN ON NOVEMBER 12, VOTED US.

5. SUPPORT FOR HOSTILE RESOLUTION:

A. ON AUGUST 8, THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION WAS SUBMITTED TO THE U.N. SECRETARIAT ALONG WITH REQUEST FOR INCLUSION OF AN ITEM IN THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF THE 30TH UNGA. CO-SPONSORS WERE: ALGERIA, BULGARIA, BURUNDI, THE BYELORUSSIANS SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, CHINA, THE CONGO, CUBA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DAHOMEY, DEMOCRATIC YEMEN, EGYPT, EQUATORIAL GUNIEA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, GUINEA, GUINEA-BISSAU, HUNGARY, IRAQ, MADAGASCAR, MALI, MALTA, MAURITANIA, MONGOLIA, PLOAND, ROMANIA, RWANDA, SIERRA LEONE, SOMALIA, THE SUDAN, THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, TOGO, THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, CONFIDENTIAL

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THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAMBIA. BY THE TIME OF THE COMMITTEE ONE VOTE, GHANA, LAOS, LIBYA, SENEGAL, UPPER VOLTA, AND THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC HAD JOINED AS CO-SPONSORS. ONEHT OTHER HAND, SIERRA LEONE, COURAGEOUSLY HAD REMOVED ITSELF AS A COSPONSOR.

B. IN 1974, THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION WS DEFEATED IN COMMITTEE ONE 48-48 (US)-38. IN 1975, IT SUCCEDED IN COMMITTEE ONE 51 -38 (US) - 50, AND IN PLENARY 54-53 (US) -42. IN COMMITTEE ONE, IT LOST FIVE 1974 VOTES IN FAVOR: JAMAICA, KUWAIT, NIGER, SIERRA LEONE, AND UGANDA. IT GAINED EIGHT VOTES IN FAVOR:

BURMA, CAMBODIA, CAPE VERDE, ETHIOPIA, LAOS, MOZAMBIQUE, SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE, AND CAMEROON. UNFORTUNATELY OUR SIDE LOST 14 NEGATIVE VOTES CAST AGAINST THE 1974 COMMUNIST-SPONSORED RESOLUTION. ECEPT FOR THE CASE OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC, THESE WERE DUE TO REGRETTABLE ABSTENTIONS BY AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CHAD, GABON, GREECE, IRAN, IVORY COAST, LESOTHO, LIBERIA, PANAMA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, TURKEY, AND VENEZUELA.

C. IN THE PLENARY VOTE, THERE WERE CHANGES FROM COMMITTEE ONE POSITIONS WHICH OVERALL RESULTED IN A MODEST PARING OF THE HOSTILE MARGIN: PANAMA VOTED FOR THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION RATHER THAN BEING ABSENT; CHAD SWITCHED FROM ABSTENTION TO A VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE COMMUNIST DRAFT; THE GAMBIA ABSTENTED ITSELF INSTEAD OF VOTING AGAINST THE HOSTILE TEXT; ON THE OTHER HAND, UPPER VOLTA WAS ABSENT RATHER THAN VOTING FOR THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION AND AUSTRALIA, LESOTHO, LIBERIA, GABON, THE IVORY COAST, AND TURKEY ALL SWITCHED FROM ABSTENTIONS TO VOTES AGAINST IT. PREDICTABLY, THE COMOROS VOTED IN FAVOR OF THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION.

D. IN PLENARY, THE ABSTENTION LISTED ON THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION INCLUDING: AFGHANISTAN, ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, SAUDI ARABIA, BHUTAN, BRAZIL, CYPRUS, ECUADOR, FIJI, FINLAND, GREECE, INDIA, INDONESIA, IRAN, JAMAICA, JORDAN, KENYA, KUWAIT, LEBANON, MALAYSIA, MALDIVES, MAURITIUS, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NEPAL, NIGER, PAKISTAN, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, PERU, PHILIPPINES, PORTUGAL, QATAR, SIERRA LEONE, SINGAPORE, SRI LANKA, SWEDEN, THAILAND, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, TUNISIA, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, CONFIDENTIAL

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VENEZUELA, AND ZAIRE.

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

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6. THE NONALIGNED VOTE IN PLENARY: IN PLENARY, THE
77 MEMBER OF THE U.N. WHO ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF THE NON-
ALIGNED CONFERENCE (NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH THE "GROUP OF
77") VOTED 13 (US) - 37-24 (3 ABSENT) ON THE FRIENDLY
RESOLUTION AND 40-8 (US)-26 (3 ABSENT) ON THE HOSTILE RES-
OLUTION. NONALIGNED MEMBERS VOTING UGAINST THE HOSTILE
RESOLUTION INCLUDED: THE CAR, GABON, IVORY COASTN LESOTHO,
LIBERIA, OMAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND SWAZILAND. ABSTAINERS IN-
CLUDED: AFGHANISTAN, ARGENTINA, BEHRAIN, BHUTAN, CYPRUS,
INDIA, INDONESIA, JAMICA, JORDAN, KENYA, KUWAIT, LEBANON,
MALAYSIS, MAURITIUS, MOROCCO, NEPAL, NIGER, PERU, QATAR,
SIERRA LEONE, SINGAPORE, SRI LANKA, TRINIDAD AND TOGAGO,
TUNISIA, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND ZAIRE. BANGLADESH, THE
GAMBIA, AND UPPER VOLTA WERE ABSENT. THE VOTE ON THE FRIEND-
LY RESOLUTION WAS A RARE OCCASION WHEN THE MAJORITY OF NONALIGNED
"YES" OR "NO" VOTES WAS NOT ON THE SUCCESSFUL SIDE. MEMBERS
OF THE NONALIGNED CONFERENCE REPRESENT WELL OVER ONE-HALF
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OF THE UN'S 144 MEMBERS. COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE COMOROS AND
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE ARE NOT YET MEMBERS OF THE NONALIGNED
CONFERENCE.

7. COMMENT:

A. HOSTILE WEAKNESS: THE TRANSPARENT DESIGN OF THE
HOSTILE SAID TO INTRUDE ON ROK SOVEREIGNTY (THE ROK HAS
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH OVER 90 COUNTRIES) AND NORTH
KOREAN INTRANSIGENCE TOWARD COMPROMISE EFFORTS DISCOURAG-
ED SUPPORT FOR IT. ADDITIONALLY, THE HEAVY-HANDED NORTH
KOREAN LOBBYING (SOME 30 ADDITIONAL NORTH KOREANS WERE IN

NEW YORK FOR THE 30TH UNGA) DREW UNFAVORABLE COMMENT HERE AND IN CAPITALS.

B. HOSTILE STRENGTH: FOURTH OF THE 53 VOTES IN PLENARY IN FAVOR OF THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION WERE FROM THE NONALIGNED. ALBANIA, BULGARIA, BYEORUSSIA, CHINA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GDR, HUNGARY, MONGOLIA, POLAND, ROMANIA, THE UKRAINE, USSR, THE COMOROS, AND SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE CONTRIBUTED THE REST. FUTURE ADMISSION TO THE UN OF COUNTRIES SUCH AS ANGOLA, THE AFARS AND ISSAS, AND THE SEYCHELLES COULD ADD SUPPORT FOR THE HOSTILE SIDE. NEVERTHELESS THERE MUST HAVE SOME CON- STERNATION ON THE HOSTILE SIDE THAT AFTER THE ADO AT THE NONALIGNED MINISTERIAL PLENERY AT LIMA OVER THE ADMISSION OF NORTH KOREA (AND THE REJECTION OF THE ROK) THAT 40 MEMBERS OF THE NONALIGNED DID NOT VOTE AGAINST THE FRIENDLY RESOLU- TION IN NEW YORK.

C. FRIENDLY STRENGTH: IN ADDITION TO STATING OUR READINESS TO SEE THE UNC TERMINATED PROVIDED ALTERNATIVE ARRANGE- MENTS TO MAINTAIN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WERE ESTABLISHED, OUR RESOLUTION UNDERLINED THE HOPE THAT ALL THE PARTIES DIRECT- LY CONCERNED WOULD ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON NEW ARRANGEMENTS DESIGNED TO REPLECE THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, REDUCE TENSIONS, AND ENSURE LASTING PEACE IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA. MOST IMPORTANTLY, SECRETARY KISSINGER'S SPEECH DURING THE GENERAL DEBATE IN PLENARY SEPTEMBER 22 MADE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR OUR READINESS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALL THE PARTIES CON- CERNED ON KOREA. ANOTHER NOTABLE STRENGTH WAS OUR INTENSIVE LOBBYING EFFORT AROUND THE WORLD AS WAS THE COHESION OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

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CORE GROUP: US, UK, FRANCE, NETHERLANDS, CANADA, SOUTH KOREA, NEW ZEALAND, JAPAN, COSTA RICA, AND FRG. ADDITIONALLY, AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN'S LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 22 TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC) ABOUT STEPS TO RESTRICT THE USE IN KOREA OF THE UN FLAG AND ABOUT THE SMALL SIZE OF THE NON-KOREAN CONTINGENT OF THE UNC TOGETHER WITH OUR REPORT ON THE UNC SUBMITTED OCTOBER 20 WERE WELL RECEIVED. THESE REPORTS EVIDENTLY LIMITED THE HOSTILE SIDE'S READINESS TO JUG THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, FOR INSTANCE, ON HIS LACK OF CURRENT IN- FORMATION ON A MAJOR UN ACTIVITY. CHINA'S AMBASSADOR HUANG HUA AND CUBA'S AMBASSADOR ALARCON WERE MUCH QUIETER ON THIS IN 1975. FURTHERMORE, NUMEROUS THIRD AND FOURTH WORLD COUNTRIES HAVE NOT BEEN UN MEMBERS LONG AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THEY HAVE FACTS AT HAND TO REFUTE COMMUNIST DISTORTIONS ABOUT THE UNC AND US FORCES IN KOREA. UN SECRETARIAT OFFICIALS HAVE EX- PRESSED SPECIAL APPRECIATION FOR THE REPORTS. THEY WOULD WELCOME PERIODIC REPORTS ON THE UNC.

D. FRIENDLY WEAKNESS: WHILE IN THE MAIN, FRIENDS

AND ALLIES HELD FIRM ON THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION, ABSENT-
IONS BY MANY OF THEM ON THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION GAVE THAT RESOLUTION
A FAR WIDER MARGIN OF SUCCESS
THAN FORESEEN AND PRECLUDED ALL CHANCE OF DEFEATING IT.
PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF PESSIMISM SEEMED UN-
CALLED FOR.

E.RECOMMENDATIONS: HOPEFULLY (REFTEL), 1976 WILL
NOT SEE A REPETITION AT THE UNGA OF KOREAN DEBATE AS IT WAS
IN 1975. USUN RECOMMENDS IN THIS DIRECTION THAT WE MAINTAIN
STEADY EMPHASIS ON OUR READINESS FOR DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIA-
TION WITH ALL THE PRITIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED ON KOREA. GIVEN
THE OTHER SIDE'S EFFORTS TO DOWNGRADE ROK SOVEREIGNTY, WE
SHOULD STRESS THAT WE WILL NEVER ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS OR
NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT SOUTH KOREAN ROLE THEREIN. WE RECALL
IN THIS REGARD WIRE-SERVICE REPORTS LAST SUMMER STATING THAT
KIM IL SUNG, THROUGH A VISITING JAPANESE POLITICAN, HAD
ASKED PREMIER MIKI OF JAPAN TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES TO BRING
ABOUT US-NORTH KOREAN NEGOTIATIONS ON A PEACE TREATY. FOR
THE UN FORUM, WE MUST INSURE THAT OUR RESPECT FOR ROK
SOVEREIGNTY IS NEVER CLOUDED BY SUCH REPORTS. REGARDING THE
STATUS OF THE UNC, THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING ABLE TO REPORT TO
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THE UNSC RELATIVELY SOON THAT THE UNC'S COMPETENCE AND THE
UNITS IT COMPREHENDS RELATE ONLY TO MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT STRIKES US AS WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION. THIS WOULD
REQUIRE ALTERNATIVE US-ROK ARRANGEMENTS ON ASPECTS OF THE
MILITARY RELATIONSHIP, BUT IT COULD HELP REMOVE THE UNC
AS A UN ISSUE. WE NOTE REPORTS THAT THE ROK MAY SEEK TO
EXPAND ITS RELATIONS WITH CERTAIN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
IN VIEW OF THE DIVERGENCE OF NONALIGNED VOTES ON KOREA AT
THE 30TH UNGA AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT DIFFERENCES AMONG
THE NONALIGNED MAY INCREASE, THIS POLICY COULD HELP IN-
CREASE SUPPORT FOR THE ROK AT THE UN.
MOYNIHAN

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